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1	THOMAS H. PETERS, Chief Ass't City Atty (SBN 163388)	
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6	Email: kelly.welch@lacity.org Attorneys for Defendant, CITY OF LOS ANGEL	Sherri R. Garter, Executive Officer/Clerk By Satrice Officer, Deputy
7 8	FEE EXEMPT – GOV. CODE § 6103	attitle Offord
	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
9	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES	
10		The state of the s
11	MAYRA ALVAREZ, an Individual) Case No.: 18STCV01722
12	Plaintiff,	Assigned to Honorable Richard E. Rico,
13	VS.	Department 17
14	73,)
15	JOSE HUIZAR, an individual; CITY OF LOS	Action Filed: October 22, 2018
16	ANGELES, a municipality; and DOES 1-10,	DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES'
17	inclusive,	ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF MAYRAALVAREZ'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT
18	Defendants.) FOR DAMAGES
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DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (ALVAREZ)

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TO THE HONORABLE COURT, PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Defendant City of Los Angeles ("Defendant City") for itself and no other party, hereby answers the allegations contained within the verified Complaint for Damages ("Complaint") filed by Plaintiff Mayra Alvarez ("Plaintiff") pursuant to the provisions set forth under Sections 431.30 and 446 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as follows:

GENERAL DENIAL

1. Under the provisions of Sections 431.30(d) and (f) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Defendant City denies generally and specifically each and every allegation contained in the Complaint and denies that Plaintiff has sustained any injury or loss by reason of any act or omission on the part of Defendant City, or the agents, servants, or employees of the City of Los Angeles, and denies that Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount alleged in the Complaint or in any other amount whatsoever.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Dismissal of Fourth Cause of Action)

1. By stipulation, Plaintiff agreed that she cannot maintain her Fourth Cause of Action, a common law claim for "Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy," against a public entity employer and on that basis, dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action with prejudice against Defendant City.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Dismissal of Claim For Punitive Damages)

2. By stipulation, Plaintiff agreed that she is not entitled to recover punitive damages against Defendant City.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to State a Cause of Action)

3. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant City.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Outside Course and Scope of Employment)

4. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part because the alleged misconduct by certain individual or individuals occurred outside the course and scope of their employment, if any, as supervisor with Defendant City and therefore, Defendant City is not vicariously and strictly liable for the alleged misconduct. Defendant City also did not know nor should have known of the alleged misconduct in order to take immediate, corrective action.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Statute of Limitations)

5. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part by the applicable statutes of limitations, including, but not limited to, California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 340 and 335.1 and California Government Code §§ 911.2, 12960, and 12965.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Laches)

6. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of laches.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies)

7. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust the necessary administrative and/or judicial remedies.

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EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to File Timely Administrative Complaint)

Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff has failed to file a timely complaint pursuant to California Government Code § 12960(d) and the California Tort Claims Act pursuant to Government Code §§ 810-996.6.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Exhaust Internal Procedures)

9. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the internal procedures that were available to resolve the claims alleged therein.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Exhaust Judicial Remedies)

10. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred by Plaintiff's failure to exhaust judicial remedies available after seeking any administrative remedies.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Uncertainty)

11. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff's Complaint is uncertain and the basis for its causes of action cannot be ascertained from the allegations stated therein.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Immunity of Public Entity)

12. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part by reason of Defendant City's immunity from liability and punitive damages under, inter alia, California Government Code §§ 815 et seq., 815.2, 815.3, 818.2, 818.8, 820.2, 820.4, 820.6, 820.8, 821, 821.6, 822.2, 825, and California Civil Code § 47.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Mitigate)

13. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate any of the damages or injuries she claims to have suffered from the acts or conduct of Defendant City or its representatives.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Waiver)

14. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff has waived and/or relinquished the claims or causes of action being asserted in this action.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Immunity for Discretionary Acts)

15. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury resulting from his or her act or omission which was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in them pursuant to California Government Code §§ 815(b), 815.2(b), 815.3, 818.2, 818.8, 820.2, 820.4, 820.6, 820.8, 821, 821.6, and 822.2, and Civil Code § 47.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Performance of Official Duty)

16. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that it is presumed that the official duty has been regularly performed by Defendant City in the absence of contrary proof pursuant to California Evidence Code § 664.

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SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Emotional Distress Barred by Workers' Compensation Act)

17. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred to the extent that Plaintiff seeks recovery for emotional distress arising out of the normal course and scope of employment, because such claim is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the California Workers' Compensation Act and cases interpreting those statutes.

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Avoidable Consequences Doctrine)

18. Without admitting that Plaintiff has sustained any damages or detriment, or that Defendant City is liable to Plaintiff in any manner whatsoever, Defendant City is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative and corrective opportunities, thereby precluding and/or limiting Plaintiff's recovery, if any, and further, that Defendant City exercised reasonable care to preclude and correct the behavior complained of by Plaintiff, if any.

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Frivolous Claims)

19. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are frivolous and known by Plaintiff to be frivolous and without foundation in fact or law. Defendant City is informed and believes and thereon alleges that this lawsuit is being pursued in bad faith for vexatious reasons for the purpose of harassing Defendant City. Accordingly, Defendant City is entitled to attorney's fees and other appropriate costs and expenses.

TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Comply with City of Los Angeles Charter)

20. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred to the extent they are based upon alleged unlawful termination of employment in that Plaintiff has failed to file an appropriate application pursuant to § 1016(c) of the Los Angeles City Charter and an appropriate demand for reinstatement and claim for compensation under § 1017 of the Los Angeles City Charter.

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TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Privileged Conduct)

21. The Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, fails in that any purported conduct of Defendant City was privileged and Defendant City was justified in engaging in such conduct.

TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Good Faith)

22. At all times mentioned, Defendant City acted in good faith.

TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Constitutional Acts)

23. At all times mentioned, Defendant City acted in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California and all state and local laws relative thereto.

TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Standing)

24. The action is barred for lack of standing to sue.

TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Res Judicata)

25. Plaintiff's claims for relief for barred, in whole or in part by the doctrine of res judicata.

TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Collateral Estoppel)

26. Plaintiff's claims for relief are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Legitimate Business Necessity/Job Relatedness)

27. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that any action alleged or perceived as adverse by Plaintiff took place because of legitimate, non-retaliatory, non-discriminatory, business necessity, and/or job-related reasons.

TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Public Entity Immunity for Acts of Others)

Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Defendant City is immune from liability on the state law claims for any injury caused by the act or omission of a person other than its employee pursuant to Cal. Government Code §§ 815(b), 815.2(b), and 820.8.

TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Notify)

29. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause of action set forth therein, are barred in whole or in part in that Plaintiff failed to comply with the remedial processes available to her by the City of Los Angeles and/or Defendant City took prompt remedial action upon notice of all of Plaintiff's alleged claims.

THIRTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Intervening and Superseding Cause)

30. The damages sustained by Plaintiff, if any, were caused, in whole or in part, by acts or omissions of third parties, which constituted a superseding and intervening cause for Plaintiff's alleged injuries, and accordingly, any recovery against Defendant City is barred in whole or in part.

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THIRTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Fault of Another)

31. Any and all injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff are the direct and proximate result of negligence, recklessness, or other wrongful conduct on the part of third parties. In the event of any judgment or recovery against Defendant City, Defendant City is entitled to a reduction of any such judgment or recovery by Plaintiff in direct proportion to the percentage of comparative fault attributable to other third parties.

THIRTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(After-Acquired Evidence)

32. Defendant City's refusal to hire Plaintiff for a position or other employment decisions that affected Plaintiff may be based on evidence acquired in the course of discovery which may justify Defendant City's decisions as lawful.

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PROOF OF SERVICE

MAYRA ALVAREZ v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al. – LASC CASE No. 18STCV01722

I, Julie A Martinez, the undersigned, say: I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action or proceeding. My business address is, 200 North Main Street, 7th Floor, City Hall East, Los Angeles, California 90012.

On December 20, 2018, I served the foregoing documents described as **DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES' ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF MAYRA ALVAREZ'S VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES,** on all interested parties in this action by placing copies thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

Terrence Jones, Esq.

LAW OFFICES OF TERRENCE JONES

6737 Bright Avenue, Suite B6

Whittier, CA 90601 Tel.: 213.863.4490

Email: terrence@jonesonlaw.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

- BY MAIL I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California, with first class postage thereon fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it is deposited with the United States Postal Service on that same day, at Los Angeles, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit; and/ or
- [] BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed above. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
- [X] BY PERSONAL SERVICE () I delivered by hand, or (X) I caused to be delivered via messenger service, such envelope to the offices of the addressee with delivery time prior to 5:00 p.m. on the date specified above.
- BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION I caused the document to be transmitted to the offices of the addressee via facsimile machine at telephone number on the date and time specified on the Transmission Report. The document was sent by fax from telephone number (213) 978-8216 and the transmission was reported complete and without error. A true copy of the Transmission Report is attached to the mailed or personal or both proof(s) of service.
- [] BY OVERNIGHT COURIER I deposited such envelope in a regularly maintained overnight courier parcel receptacle prior to the time listed thereon for pick-up. Hand delivery was guaranteed by the next business day.

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 20, 2018, at Los Angeles, California.

JULIE A MARTINEZ